The differentiation of the problem was, on principle, achieved by Leibniz. .
.
. . First of all, he located the crucial point of the difficulty
by
differentiating between geometry and phoronomy [a Kantian term: a theory
of
motion deducible from
*
a priori
*
conceptions] on the one side and mechanics on the other. The relativity
of
position and motion is indisputable as long as we deal with them as
'purely
mathematical" problems. Nature, however, does not offer the
spectacle of
abstractly shoving bodies that change their relative positions
chaotically. It
offers the spectacle of a calculable order in the relative
movements.

This order in the movements cannot be explained within the realm of geometry. For the purpose of its interpretation we have to go beyond the purely mathematical principles and introduce a "metaphysical" principle ["metaphysics" meant to Leibniz the general science of principles excluding only mathematics and geometry.]. Whether we call this principle Form, or Entelechy, or Force, is irrelevant as long as we remember that only the notion of forces will express it intelligibly. . . . Moreover, by localizing the difficulty in the theory of dynamics, Leibniz correctly marked the direction in which the solution had to be sought and ultimately was found, that is, the geometrization of physics.

. . . . The localization of the difficulty is the first step toward
a
solution, but it is not the solution itself. . . . the introduction of
force is
immediately followed by the differentiation into
*
vis primitiva
*
and
*
vis derivativa
*
, that is, into force in the sense of an inherent quality of substance
and
force in the phenomenal sense. Primitive force (whether active or
passive) is
substantial force, and its problems belong to metaphysics in the
narrower
sense. This primitive force belongs among the general causes that
are
insufficient for the explanation of phenomena. Derivative force arises
as it
were through a limitation of primitive force through the interaction
(
*
conflictus
*
) of bodies in various ways.

The differentiation of primitive and derivative force, and in particular the definition of phenomenal force, is the decisive achievement of Leibniz. The problem of absoluteness is eliminated through the definition of phenomenal force as force in relation to other forces. Phenomenal force is relative force by definition; and only this phenomenal force is the object of physics. Force has no meaning beyond the meaning that is contained in the differential equations of physics.

. . . . The third step in Leibniz's analysis is the clarification of the
ideas
of space and time.
His most mature formulation of this problem is to
be found in the
correspondence with Clarke, which was an indirect
correspondence with Newton
because the latter collaborated with Clarke in the
answers. . . . "I have
stressed more than once that I consider space
something
*
purely relative,
*
just as time; it is an order of coexistences, just as time is an order
of
successions. For space signifies, in terms of possibility, an order of
things
that exist at the same time, insofar as they exist together,
without
determining their particular way of existing."

. . . . Space and time of physics, thus, are not qualities of reality; they are orders that the mind applies to the interpretation of phenomena. The problem of absolute space cannot arise if space is understood as an ideal form that constitutes the order of phenomena. This solution not only eliminates the Newtonian problem of absolute space critically, it also gives a positive answer to the question of objectivity in science. We do not have to search for the absolute validity of propositions in an absolute reality because the objectivity of science has its source in the order of the mind.